By Mahn Kyaw Swe with Megan S. Mills 
 
The NLD (National League for Democracy) party has offered the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) recognition.  If the results of the 1990 election are adopted, a military role will be accepted in national politics.  The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) has supported the NLD’s reconciliation offer in Burmese communities overseas, yet the offer lacks important ingredients, towards a number of probabilities.  Most important is the offer’s lack of a good faith inclusion towards ending human rights violations in ethnic areas and lesser known political prisoners throughout the country, Burma.     More... 
The Best Case Scenario 
If the SPDC generals accept the NLD offer, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will engage in an interim government supervised by a leader or leaders from the ASEAN community.   In this scenario, DASSK and ASEAN leaders could persuade the SPDC to free Burma’s political prisoners without exception.  The NLD and DASSK, the SPDC and ethnic opposition groups would draft a federal democratic constitution suiting the needs of a multi-ethnic nation, and the international community, the UNDP (United Nations Development Program and the WHO (World Health Organizations) could begin to tackle Burma’s poverty, environmental decay, HIV/AIDs crisis and malnutrition.  Dam projects would pause, and resume with proper advance planning schemes.  DASSK could request an end to all military operations against ethnic resistance forces like the KNU (Karen National Union), KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party), and Shan State Army South, and all human rights violations affecting ethnic civilians.  Burma could then enact a national reconciliation plan of various elected representatives.   
The Worst Case Scenario
The SPDC may ignore the NLD offer and continue the propaganda of enforcing national security, viewing DASSK as a threat to this security, and extending her house arrest for another year, together with U Tin Oo.  There will be new harassment of NLD party members and Shan, Kachin, PaOo, Palaung, Mon and Karreni leaders, new detentions, and the SPDC may also continue to violate ceasefire agreements, forcing groups to surrender or ‘turning’ them to local militias for an elaborate proxy war of Karen against Karen, Kachin against Kachin, Shan against Shan, or Pa-O against Pa-O, and between different ethnic groups.  The SPDC could also promote its USDA (Union Solidarity and Development Association) over the long term, barring other opposition groups, led by the NLD and ethnic parties that won the 1990 election.  In this case, there would be increased pressure on ceasefire groups such as the Kachin Independent Organization (KIO), Shan State Army – North (SSA-N), Shan State National Army (SSNA), Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) and the Karenni State Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF).   
The SPDC may accept the NLD nominally, only to prolong its rule of tyranny by stalling negotiations after freeing DASSK.  Talks could be inconsequential, a distraction for foreign observers, while the military continues its campaign against ceasefire and non-ceasefire observing opposition groups.  Releasing DASSK would reduce international criticism as other political prisoners remained incarcerated, whether NLD or other political persons or human right activists.  In short, by appearing to support the agreement, the SPDC may be capable of far more military activity and forced labour drafts, slapping a moratorium on past practices in the countryside.  Military and civil authorities could collaborate, for instance, to cover up forced labour, warning village heads not to divulge information to delegates of the International Labour Organization (ILO) or other visiting bodies.  It is likely, too, that the SPDC would use the NLD party to broker talks with armed ethnic factions, just as the SPDC prime minister, Khin Nyunt, used religious figures, intellectuals, and monks to lure the KNU to a ceasefire, as created deep distrust of all peace efforts.  If the NLD was used in this manner, through U Aung Shwe, and ignoring DASSK, or other leaders, the NLD would
become just another vehicle of junta policy, forfeiting its popular support, as would mean the end of the NLD Party in Burma’s political history.   
As it stands, the NLD and NCGUB must be alert to SPDC tactics, emphasizing such issues as forced labour, the destruction of villages, internal displacement and refugee flows, not to mention extortion and random killings, atop overall corruption.  A regime committed to reform will rein in its troops and reduce abuses, but no such thing is happening.  The NLD should have demanded an end to human rights abuses as a preliminary term when the offer was first made.  At the very least, the offer should echo the statement of the CRPP, but it does not.      
The Face of Reality 
The SPDC generals can maintain their dignity by aiding domestic peace, reconciliation and Burma’s economic reconstruction.  This means recognizing the 1990 election result and as a past refusal to recognize the 1990 election has underlain military rule which has been a fundamental cause of Burma’s socioeconomic decline.  The NLD and ethnic factions have all sustained bad experiences of the SPDC, towards wide scale resentment and general distrust.  
In 1995, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) – the principal Mon opposition group – entered a ceasefire agreement with Rangoon, at the urging of the regime and Thai political and business interests, but the aftermath saw resumed forced labour and confiscations of land and food.  According to Nai Kasauh Mon of the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, “the ceasefire [agreement] with the government has only had a negative impact on the Mon people because [the regime] has confiscated private rubber plantations … and increased troop levels throughout Mon State�.  Recently, the NMSP refused to participate in the junta’s national convention, openly denouncing the convention as fruitless with regard to ethnic rights.    
For the Karen National Union (KNU),  a meeting backed by Thai military and business leaders produced a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ to end problems of refugees, internally displaced persons, and human rights violation in Karen State, but the so-called gentleman’s agreement fell apart with Gen. Khin Nyunt’s ouster, last year, without a formal ceasefire agreement.  The SPDC sent in religious and intellectual figures to meet KNU leaders for pre-ceasefire discussions so that the KNU leader, Saw Bo Mya, ordered KNLA soldiers to avoid any engagement with government troops.  “We do not actively engage Burmese soldiers because of the peace talks,� said one of the soldiers of Battalion 101, “we try to keep away from them, but they always find us and attack.� 
In September 2005, an 800-strong brigade of the Shan State Army North (SSAN) abandoned their base rather than disarm but the SPDC’s information minister, Kyaw Hsan, stated that “peace� had been secured with Burma’s armed ethnic movements.  Nam Khur Hsen, an SSA-S spokeswoman commented, “if things are improving, why are people fleeing to Thailand every day?�  The Army presence in Shan State has increased dramatically, from about 40 battalions in 1988 to a current strength above 200, according to Khuensai Jaiyen, of the Shan Herald Agency for News.  In November 2005, the Shan leaders Hkun Htun Oo, Sai Nyunt Lwin, Maj-Gen. Hso Ten, Ba Thin, Myint Than, Nyi Moe, Myo Min Htun, Tun Nyo, Sai Hla Aung and Sao Tha Oo received 79 to 106-year jail sentences, charged with defaming the state, association with illegal parties and conspiracy against the state.  Defendants were denied their choice of legal counsel. 
The recent shooting of 5 members of a Kachin ceasefire group with ties to the Rangoon regime sent shock waves through Kachin State putting the group’s authority in question as Rangoon claimed that the deaths of 5 KIO soldiers and a civilian owed to friendly fire.  However, the KIO – drawing on eye witness accounts – says the attack was deliberate.  Burmese troops expand their presence in the region where some Kachins have lost faith in their leaders — despite economic concessions derived from the ceasefire, as in logging, mining and fishing operations that provide much-needed resources for Kachin State’s administration and defense.  Sales of some industrial concessions, notably, to Chinese firms, have produced environmental damage.   
“Global Witness reports about destructive and unsustainable logging, and exploitation of Burma’s over 100 years old teak wood in Kachin State by Chinese logging companies, is linked to ethnic conflict. The SPDC’s
mismanagement of internal and foreign relations includes questions of access to natural resources, coercion, non-transparent and poorly planned ceasefire terms, and corruption.�
In the Chin region in November 2005, there were reports of indiscriminate killings, prohibitive orders, extortion and forced labour, before SPDC soldiers shot dead 2 children and critically injured 6 other civilians in Matupi Town, on November 12.  The Chin Human Rights Organization states that witnesses identified soldiers of the Light Infantry Battalion 304 responsible for the incident.  Chin activists also report religious persecution as in January of 2005 when a Christian cross atop Mount Boi near Matupi town was destroyed, on direct order of Colonel San Aung.  More than 90% of the Chin State population are Christians and the 50 foot concrete cross had been erected by local donations at a cost of 3.5 million Kyats.  After its destruction troops of the Light Infantry Battalion 304 hoisted a Burmese flag.  There are reports that the regime plans to build a pagoda on Mt. Boi.   
Burmese political activists and human rights lawyers remain incarcerated.  On October 6, 1994, San San Nwe was arrested with her daughter, and found guilty of ‘publishing information harmful to the state’ with a view to ‘fomenting disorder’.  She received a 7-year sentence, the maximum provided by emergency law, and a further 3 years for ‘giving biased viewpoints’ to French journalists in April 1993.  She was also accused of providing information about the human rights situation to the UN Special Rapporteur for Burma.   
In March of 2005, the UN special envoy to Burma, Mr. Razali Ismail, resigned, explaining that trying to talk to the SPDC and Than Shwe was like trying to reason with the American mass-murderer, Charles Manson, as one got nowhere.     
“CRPP issued a statement on 30th September 2005… that SLORC and SPDC have repeatedly refused to implement or abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations… they have put a stop to all contact or cooperation with the special UN representative.  Beside this deliberate flouting and ignoring process, they are planning to go ahead with implementing their … one-sided agenda.  The country’s future will be very bleak and hazardous… Political, economic, and social and other problems cannot be ever solved by a one-sided and inequitable agenda.  Therefore, all political parties (including the ethnic nationalities), the democratic forces, all other organizations, the monks, students and the masses hereby urge the United Nations Security Council to intervene and take appropriate action to bring an end to the many hardships and the plight of the citizens of Burma.â€?
The CRPP also asked nations of the UN Security Council to act upon the report submitted by Czech ex-President, Vaclav Havel, and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Desmond Tutu, requesting an end to objections, obstacles and vetoes, towards a peaceful resolution for the people of Burma.  However, the humanitarian crisis prevails in the Karen, Karenni and Shan states and other ethnic areas.  Burma features more than 1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as well as 250,000 refugees forced to leave their homes with what they might carry.  Some are relocated to camps where their freedom is severely restricted amid brutal treatment.  Livestock is normally confiscated, villages burned to the ground, and landmines sewn to discourage people’s return.  Villagers without the option of internment at a concentration site as attacked by the army, the people killed or chased into the jungle.   
The regime states that it aims to crush all resistance and ‘punish’ ethnic groups.  More than 200,000 from the Karen State now hide along the Thai border, in need of medical care, clothing, school supplies, moral encouragement and spiritual support.  Ethnic teams of medics, teachers and church workers have responded, delivering rice, medicines and supplies, regardless of recipients’ ethnicity, religion or political affiliations.  More help is needed.  Fugitives fear discovery by the army or accusations of contact with outside supporters.  The atmosphere of fear owes to past Burmese military actions that have destroyed property as well as the rape, torture and murder of villagers.  Where villages survive, residents live under constant surveillance, subject to forced labor and random punishment.  
“No transition process is worthy of the name as long as fundamental freedoms of assembly, expression and association are denied; voices advocating democratic reform are silenced; elected representatives are imprisoned; and human rights defenders are criminalized.  No progress will be made towards national
reconciliation as long as key political representatives are being locked behind bars, their constituents subject to grave and systematic human rights abuses and their political concerns disregarded.â€?   – UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma, Report.
Who is a Political Prisoner? 
The KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) notes how the NLD makes little mention of political prisoners, beyond its own membership, towards human rights summaries that refer to 1100 political prisoners — in educated, urban persons who are almost exclusively Burmans.  Foreign governments tend to accept even narrower assessments of political detentions in Burma when, in truth, there are more than 25,000 political prisoners in farmers, day labourers and others imprisoned under Article 17.1 — contact with illegal organizations, or Article 17.2 — rising against the state, although these need not apply, at all, to the circumstances under which ordinary citizens are imprisoned.  These mainly rural and ordinary Burmese cities are not seen as political prisoners.  No one writes on their behalf or acknowledges their existence, though their treatment is far worse than that of higher profile prisoners.  Many of these ‘invisibles’ have been summarily executed, part of a rationale of killing one and frightening a thousand much used by the SPDC.    
Is a Chin farmer hauled off to an SPDC Army camp, falsely accused of supplying rice for the Chin National Front, not a political prisoner?  Is he not a political prisoner when tied up, beaten, slashed with knives, and held down as a gallon of water is poured in his nose, then locked in medieval leg stocks or a pit in the ground, for weeks?  When a Karen woman’s husband flees to the forest to avoid forced portering, she is arrested, raped and detained at an Army camp till her “rebel� husband gives himself up for torture and execution.  Is the Karen woman not a political prisoner, given the reason for her arrest?  According to the SPDC, such persons are not prisoners of conscience and the NLD and international human rights groups exclude them from discussions of political imprisonment, as many more thousands of ethnic citizens undergo not just detention but heinous abuse.  The Karen Human Rights Group asserts that the SPDC will hide evidence, just as the NLD continues to neglect mention of ethnic prisoners.   
The Role of International Communities 
Of course, a regime genuinely pursuing a transition of power would concede the problem and take steps to remedy it, ceasing military sweeps in ethnic areas, just as such a regime would cease burning villages, murdering innocent civilians, and would crack down on incidents of rape and torture.  As the international community focuses on DASSK’s house arrest, the SPDC has launched a new offensive in remote areas, to levels of troop movement unseen for almost 10 years.  Cross-border aid from surrounding democracies has been blocked by severing supply channels, as Burma’s neighbours have been accused by the SPDC of ‘meddling’ in domestic affairs.  Governments are urged to put an end to cross-border humanitarian aid.  In view of these developments, the human rights situation seems bound to worsen despite expressions of optimism to do with the NLD Offer.  It seems rather obvious that including the SPDC in an interim government involving DASSK, towards democratization, will not benefit Burma’s significant minorities.  Workable reform must involve Burma’s ethnic minorities who are certainly entitled to know what deals are being made to shape their future, by a proposed consortium of Burmese military and democratic politicos.  
The Role of Citizens and People’s Power 
Daw Aung San Su Kyi clearly stated in her speech about NLD policy after the 1990 election ignored by the generals, “we will never give up.  The results of the 1990 General Elections must be implemented; a resolution already taken by the United Nations. We already know that the General Assembly of the United Nations has accepted the notion that the will of the people has been expressed in the 1990 General Elections. This is something we can not abandon. It will be to the detriment of our country if after an election has been held, the results are not honoured and we do not resist attempts to trivialize it.�  
Burma must establish a political and economic system of benefit to all communities if it is to meet the challenges of Globalization.  All citizens must engage in ending the country’s civil war of 6 decades in a manner that does not prompt ethnic groups to break away from the union.  A society is rather like a family,
and none of us wish to live with abusive family members.  SPDC isolationism, wishing to be left alone by the international community, will not be productive in globalization’s competitive environment, as it produces new sources of domestic strife and cross-border instability.  An end must be brought to political violence within Burma, and this will require an international role, of some kind. 
The Burmese public needs to better understand the ‘open’ political systems of other countries to promote ethnic harmony, acquiring knowledge of participation, rather than relying on a single leader or party.  Corruption can be offset by institutions and procedures that help to pre-empt corruption.  In all of these regards, Canada offers promising lessons, in a universal charter of rights and freedoms, official multiculturalism, efforts to instill ‘anti-racism’, atop a workable system of confederation that has linked a group of once contrasting colonies, since 1867.  Canada has valued citizens of all cultures and languages, towards a unique variety of integration.  In this illumination, Burma requires a federal union that can correct the junta’s longstanding propaganda and manipulation of so called separatism, and a political and civic culture that does not see corruption as an excusable, natural feature of government.  Rather than fear or apathy, the Burmese public needs to know the capabilities of an open democratic system, as Daw Su Su Nwe demonstrated the path of challenging against SPDC justice system.  In Canada, the former Ontario premier, Mike Harris, having to defend his role in the death of Dudley George, an Indian leader at Ipperwash Park.  Similarly, the former Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, had to testify concerning the 2005 sponsorship scandal.  These phenomena would be seen as scarcely possible in Burma.   
[The author, Mahn Kyaw, is a Canada- based human rights activist who studies anti-racist multiculturalism and Canada’s model of confederation.  Megan S. Mills is a Toronto researcher long interested in subjects Asian – and Burmese.]Â